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Operating Across Boundaries

Leading Adaptive Change

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10

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Human beings have long known how to create productive inter-group relationships. Hunters and gatherers knew how to trade, marry across bands, and collaborate seasonally on hunting herds for food. After beginning to settle into agricultural communities ten to fourteen thousand years ago, people created large social systems with multiple, internal group boundaries, applying their early know-how to more-complex arrangements. We drew upon shared history, tradition, and language as we created more-intricate and defined norms of interchange and developed ramified authority structures in which those who were given authority identified and generated complementary goals for their groups and super-ordinate goals for groups of groups.

As we know from studies of traditional societies like the !Kung, cultural norms routinize the knowledge and behaviors needed in normal times to coordinate both in-group and intergroup interactions. In times of challenge, however, those with authority must be able to step in and coordinate problem solving on problems for which the usual norms of social operation do not quite suffice. Someone or some subgroup of authorities, often elders and specialists, must dip into a deeper reservoir of knowledge

1

and make decisions to resolve conflicts both within their community and between communities. The variety of instruments to promote productive intergroup exchange must be learned and practiced by authorities within each group whose trust from their own group is based, in part, on their competence in managing routine, and yet critically productive, transactions across group boundaries.[1]

Successful intergroup relationships are ubiquitous. One can simply walk down the street to any set of neighborhood shops and listen to a store owner describe the many arrangements with vendors and suppliers that sustain a business. Indeed, perhaps no commercial entity functions without successful daily intergroup transactions. In a sense, any organization's current authority structures, expertise, processes, and cultural norms can be seen as adaptations to a past set of challenges that demanded innovation in managing complex intergroup activity. Having enabled the organization to thrive, these once-creative adaptations became routine. People learned, by and large, what they were supposed to do.[2] Those with the greatest adaptability thrived, passing on their lessons to posterity, whereas many organizations and communities failed and perished in the face of new adaptive pressures.[3]

We need to explore intergroup leadership, then, not because we have little successful experience with it but because we face important challenges for which our current repertoire of strategies for managing relationships across group boundaries still does not suffice. Beyond the financial and economic crises of 2008, we live with the daily wastes of social division, prejudice, and war. Less dramatic, but equally wasteful, are the failures to achieve synergy across divisions within an organization or between companies rendered one entity after an acquisition.

This chapter briefly outlines the kind of work required when our organizations and communities face intergroup problems requiring some degree of new organizational or cultural adaptation. We focus on three aspects of adaptive work: the commonality of loss, the politics of inclusion and exclusion, and the task of renegotiating loyalties. But first we briefly explore the metaphor of adaptation itself as it applies to our collective lives.

Adaptability

The term *adaptation* comes from evolutionary biology. As with any metaphor, particularly one as abused as Darwin's theory of natural selection, we need

to be cautious with the insights it offers and the ways we use them. In biological systems, adaptive pressures arise outside an individual organism: the ecosystem generates new challenges and opportunities. In cultural systems, however, pressures to change may emerge from external sources (changes in taste, competition, technology, and public policy) or internal sources (shifts in orienting values, organizational priorities, balances of power, and competencies). In either case, an adaptive challenge routinely generates intergroup conflict in which the gap between goals and actual conditions is perceived differently—internally by different groups within a larger organization, or externally between separate groups, organizations, or factions.

These gaps cannot be closed with routine behavior and existing know-how. To meet an adaptive challenge, groups must change some of their own priorities, loyalties, and competencies as they develop a set of responses and relationships that enable them to thrive anew collectively in the face of new external challenges, or to achieve a new internally generated normative conception of what thriving may mean in their environment, or both. For example, external challenges posed by Toyota demanded new intergroup behavior of all sorts among engineering and business units within General Motors. Internal challenges posed by civil rights activists in the United States demanded new intergroup behavior among many groups within U.S. national boundaries.

In biology, evolution *conserves* most of an organism's core processes. More than 98 percent of human and chimpanzee DNA is identical; a less than 2 percent difference accounts for our dramatically increased range of function. Similarly in cultures, adaptive leadership is only in part about change: successful change is likely to build on the past. Rarely does success seem to be the result of a zero-based, ahistorical, start-over approach, except perhaps as a deliberate exercise in strategic rethinking. Most radical revolutions fail, and those that succeed have more, rather than less, in common with their heritage. The American Revolution, for example, created a political system with deep roots in British and European political philosophy, experience, and culture. New, thriving businesses such as Google have much more in common with their antecedents than less, both technologically and organizationally.

Yet we cannot lose sight of the fact that in biology, as in culture, new adaptations *generate loss, and for human beings, a host of emotions associated with those losses*; not many people like to be displaced, rearranged, or reregulated.

One group's innovation can make the people in another group feel incompetent, betrayed, or irrelevant. New adaptations can threaten and disturb individual identity, anchored in past and current group loyalties. As students of leadership and change have long explored, adaptive pressures often generate a defensive reaction as people in groups try to ameliorate the disruptions and pain associated with their losses.[4] The practice of leadership therefore requires first the diagnostic ability to recognize these losses and identify predictable defensive patterns at both group and intergroup systemic levels. Second, it requires the know-how to counteract these defenses in order to keep people engaged and facing the challenge within and across group boundaries, accepting losses on behalf of collective necessity and gains, and developing new integrative capacity.

The Old Testament offers an archetypal example of how new challenges and aspirations threaten group identity. Leading the Israelites out of Egypt, Moses knew where to go: follow trade routes (which we now know had been in use for more than thirty thousand years) across the Sinai. Moses arrived at the Promised Land within eighteen months of the Exodus, but when he sent scouts to investigate, all of them but Joshua and Caleb reported not only a fruitful land but also cities with people who looked like giants: "We seemed like grasshoppers in our own eyes, and we looked the same to them." The Bible tells us that lacking faith in themselves and in God, they demanded that Moses take them back to Egypt, enslaved but secure.

Moses fell on his face in despair. He had discovered the hard way that the problem was located in people's hearts and minds, beyond any expert solution he or divine power could provide. With the support of God and a small faction that included Joshua, Caleb, and Aaron, Moses prepared himself for the long haul. Identity, anchored in slave–master intergroup relationships, had to evolve into a new identity anchored in new institutional and spiritual relationships among the Israelites themselves. Moses spent nearly thirty-nine more years leading people on a journey toward a faithful and self-governing society, and even then the job was not finished.[5]

Adaptive challenges stress the organism. If the species is lucky, it will have variant individuals in its population who are capable of surviving (albeit under stress) in the more-challenging environment, buying time for further variations to emerge and consolidate more-robust adaptations. Joshua and Caleb can be seen as the variant, adaptive individuals among the group of scouts sent into Canaan.

One task of leadership, therefore, is to identify the sources of *positive deviance* in the population, sources of more-adaptive innovation already

emerging in some groups in the culture, from which to build new capacity.[6] But building on and consolidating these adaptive variants takes time, because people in different groups must learn, across boundaries, how to take advantage of them. Thus, the practice of leadership involves orchestrating conflict and discovery across group boundaries, regulating the disequilibrium those differences generate in the organization, and holding the parties through a sustained period of stress. During this period they sift out what is precious from what is expendable within their own groups, and they identify and run new experiments in variation to determine which innovations will work collectively.

The Commonality of Loss

What inhibits our ability to respond to adaptive challenges in a timely fashion with innovation and courage? Sometimes, of course, the challenge is beyond our capacity. Vesuvius erupts, and we simply cannot do anything about it, hard as we might try. But sometimes, even though we might have it within our collective capacity to respond successfully, we squander the opportunity. For these cases, we suggest that the common factor generating adaptive failure is resistance to loss.

Losses come in many forms among individuals, organizations, and societies, from direct losses of goods such as wealth, status, authority, influence, security, and health, to indirect losses such as competence and loyal affiliation. In our experience, the common aphorism that people resist change is more wrong than right. People do not resist change per se; they resist loss. People usually embrace change when they anticipate a clear net benefit. Rarely does anyone return a winning lottery ticket. People resist change when change involves the possibility of giving up something they hold dear.

We find two common pathways in the patterns by which people resist losses and risk adaptive failure: diversion of attention and displacement of responsibility. These take a wide variety of forms in organizations and politics, including using decoys and distracting issues, tackling only the aspects of the problem that fit a group's competence, jumping to solutions without adequate diagnosis, misusing consultants, blaming authority, scapegoating, personalizing the issues, launching ad hominem attacks, and externalizing the enemy.

These protective patterns may restore intragroup stability and *feel* less stressful than facing the changes that adaptation would require. However,

they also enable groups to avoid engaging with one another in the often-disruptive process of sifting through their cultural DNA in order to decide what to keep and what to leave behind.[7] They end up trading off the long term on behalf of the short term. Many people who worked for GM and Ford perceived risks in their companies' strategic commitment to producing big cars with large fuel appetites and hefty emissions. They could see the skyrocketing demand for oil in vibrant new economies in Asia and growing urgency about climate change. But they could not engage their colleagues, senior management, unions, and workers sufficiently to mobilize a timely change in the cost basis and kinds of cars GM and Ford produced.

Sometimes such defensive behaviors are deliberate and provide strategic protection against the threat of change, but sometimes they are unplanned, poorly monitored, or unconscious reactions. Reality testing—the effort to grasp the problem fully—is an early victim of the reaction to social and personal disequilibrium associated with adaptation. People may initially assess and address problems realistically. But if that assessment does not pay early dividends, moving into a protective posture may take precedence over enduring the prolonged uncertainty associated with weighing divergent views, running costly experiments, and facing the need to refashion loyalties and develop new competencies. For example, the failure of Xerox to exploit the breakthrough technologies developed at its own Palo Alto Research Center—technology then seized upon by Apple and others—has become legendary only because it dramatizes a common phenomenon.

With sustained distress, people often produce misdiagnoses: a society may scapegoat a faction because of a dominant perception that it is indeed responsible for the problem, or worse. A classic study of thirty-five dictatorships showed that all of them emerged in societies facing crisis.[8] The Great Depression of the 1930s generated such deep yearnings for quick and simple solutions in many countries around the world that groups in them lost the capacity to operate across boundaries to critically and open-mindedly reality-test different strategies for restoring their own local and national economies. A reversion to narrower identity groups took hold. Charismatic demagoguery, repression, scapegoating, and externalizing the enemy were all in play, leading to the catastrophes of World War II.

The Politics of Inclusion: Defining the Groups in Play

Adaptive work consists of the learning required either to resolve internal contradictions in people's values and strategic priorities or to diminish the

gap between these priorities and the realities people face. This work entails spurring groups to clarify what matters most, in what balance, with what trade-offs. What will it mean for us to thrive? And who is "us," anyway? Where do we set the boundaries of the system? In the case of a local industry that pollutes a river, people want clean water, but they also want jobs. In the long run, given the spread of environmental values, an industrial polluter will deeply harm its reputation or even fail if it neglects the health of its host community. Conversely, a community may lose its economic base if it overlooks the needs of its industry. Do we bound the system at the level of the business organization, or the local community it inhabits?

Determining which parties and issues to include in cross-boundary consultation is a strategic decision. Leadership requires asking the critical question, Who should play a part in the deliberations, and in what sequence? Including too many parties can overload people's capacity to learn and to accommodate one another. However, social systems that fail to be inclusive may devise an incomplete solution or a solution to the wrong problem. At a minimum, those who lead must keep track of missing perspectives. Not only can lack of information undermine the quality of collective work among the included groups, but also excluded parties may sabotage the process of sustainable change.

Deciding who should play a part in the deliberations is not a given, but is itself a critical strategic question. Strategy begins with asking, Who needs to learn what in order for the group to make progress on this challenge? How can one build a holding environment and strengthen the bonds that join the stakeholders together as a community of interests so that they withstand the divisive forces of problem solving? Is a concern so critical that it threatens the community's survival? Does a party represent a constituency that must accept change if the larger community is to make progress? Does the party's perspective generate so much distress that including it would disrupt the work of building any kind of coalition within the functioning cross-boundary working group? If the party is important in the medium or long term but not in the short term, one might initially exclude it from a working group.

This is one of the pains of leadership. People must sometimes be excluded and the issues they represent put aside, regardless of their validity. Consider the issue of slavery when the U.S. Constitution was being drafted during the Federal Convention of 1787. During that summer, many divisive issues had to be resolved by framers representing very different perspectives on the nature of government and the balance between liberty and order, local and national control, and the division and sharing

of powers. To prevent fragmentation into North and South, the framers made a deliberate decision to avoid a strong stand on the institution of slavery—but they did not reach that decision until after some effort. In August 1787, they tried to tackle slavery, but James Madison quickly sensed that if they persisted in doing so, they would unravel the whole tapestry of union and lose the opportunity to form a more coherent federal government than that provided by the Articles of Confederation.[9]

This decision, however brutal in its effects, made sense even to some who abhorred slavery. "A more perfect union" mattered more, and some seventy-five years later when slavery was finally abolished, the union tested by war was strong enough to survive. But the experience of the Civil War also illustrates the extraordinary danger of leaving a tough issue on the back burner for too long. Although the issue may go away, it may also explode into a future crisis.

Running that risk may be necessary. But when adaptive capacity increases as the community successfully addresses its initial set of problems, it is prudent to reintroduce the neglected issues. Perhaps had politicians done so more vigorously and effectively in the first decades of this nation, and before cotton became central to the South's economy and social and cultural life, the Civil War could have been averted. Indeed, momentarily in 1790, during the first Congress, the North faced the need to share the pains of change by sharing the capital losses of Southern plantation owners, but the losses seemed inconceivably high at the time. The North refused to pay the costs of eliminating slavery, then only to pay far greater costs in the losses of the Civil War itself in treasure, life, and the nation's long-term political health.

Leadership is at once the grand art of engaging the polity in its work, tolerating high levels of intergroup conflict and holding people's attention and responsibility within and across groups to issues in a timely fashion. It is also the personal art of staying alive to fight another day. In both senses leadership is a distinctly political activity. Although the benefits and costs of exclusion and inclusion fluctuate, a bias toward the inclusion of issues and parties gives those who lead more options for diagnosis and action. Developing the network of intergroup relationships also creates resources and builds resilience for future crises.

Refashioning Loyalties Across Boundaries

Working groups that come together to address an adaptive problem nearly always consist of representatives of factions communicating across

boundaries. Like a legislative group, working groups are likely to mirror the complexity of the larger system.

To forge such a group of groups, those who lead must understand the relationships among the factions and the pressures from each representative's constituents. Each faction has its own grammar for analyzing a situation in ways that make sense to its members. Shaped by tradition, power relationships, and interests, this internal language of problem solving is used largely unconsciously, but members of the faction know intuitively when it is misused. In leading multiparty groups, leaders therefore need to sense the separate languages and identify the loyalties that anchor how each group makes sense of its current situation. Every first-rate diplomat and negotiator has an ear for groups' styles of discourse and subtexts of interest.

More difficult is the need to convince participants to refashion elements of their in-group loyalties as they work across boundaries to forge a coalition as a working group that produces a proposed adaptive solution. In leading such a process, leaders in essence seek to form a new coalition with these people, where the coalition entity—the working group—has a purpose that redirects the narrower purposes of the factions. If leaders succeed, then the working group will achieve a new self-perceived boundary of identity and cohesion of self-interest. New loyalties emerge among representatives working across boundaries, a process that often takes many months of confidential meetings. We call this phase I of adaptive work. New loyalties anchor a new collective identity.

However, the most difficult challenge often lies ahead, in phase II, when the members of the working group must go back to their constituents to promote the new adaptive arrangements. It is at this point that many negotiations and adaptive intergroup processes falter. After a working group succeeds in coming up with integrative ideas, each "representative" member must lead her own constituents in incorporating and refining the results of the group process, or else the deal unravels. Confronting what negotiation theorists call the *constituency problem*, the working group coalition can be pulled apart when members face accusations from their constituents that they have sold out.[10] Claiming they have been betrayed, constituents demand a return to previous postures.

To succeed in phase II, representatives must consult with each other on how best to communicate new shared understandings to their organizations, and together they must develop a problem-solving infrastructure that helps build each faction's capacity to adapt to change. A coordinated strategy across factional boundaries—with many opportunities for midcourse

corrections by working-group members as they encounter resistance, and new information, within their own factions—greatly increases the odds that constituents will accept and implement the proposed solutions achieved in phase I of problem-solving negotiation.

Yet collaborative leadership consultations between working-group members on implementation strategy and tactics may be the most neglected phase of multiparty negotiations, and a common source of breakdown. Leading the process requires constructing relationships that hold these factional representatives together despite the accusations of betrayal that will pull them apart.

For example, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators spent many hours and days in Oslo in 1993 refashioning deep personal loyalties to achieve common ground. It is probably fair to say, however, that they did not sufficiently prepare themselves to engage their own people in a parallel process of adaptive compromise and innovation. They did not have a flexible and adaptive joint strategy with which to make repeated midcourse corrections in their efforts to reshape the entrenched perspectives of their own peoples. Accused of disloyalty, they were overwhelmed by the backlash within each of their communities. They began to damage their newly formed alliances, and they allowed the progress they had made to be derailed by extremists.

Experiencing and being accused of disloyalty generate extraordinary dissonance, because negotiators risk rupturing the primary relationships that anchor their identity and power. Sometimes, their constituents would rather die or kill than face the emotional pain of experiencing ruptured ties, accusations of betrayal from their peers, and the imagined dismay of their ancestors, and they hold their politicians responsible to preserve these loyalties rather than challenge them. Refashioning loyalties lies at the heart of adaptive work, and it explains why it is so dangerous and difficult. Rabin and Sadat were assassinated by their own people. Egyptian president Muhammad Hosni Mubarak warned Arafat after the Camp David negotiations in the summer of 2000 that any proposal that asked refugees to give up a return to their ancestral homes would lead to Arafat's assassination, too.

To orchestrate multiparty conflict, one must create a containing vessel, a holding environment of structures and processes to sustain each representative in a heated set of interactions. This may take months or years, because the process of enrichment among the leading negotiators also means a loosening of some of the habits of thought and loyalties that each

brings to the process from being at home with his own kind. But constituent pressures are usually more powerful than these new bonds of understanding and collaboration. Tested, then, with various kinds of loyalty tests, and confronted with dangers that can include the risk of death, expulsion, or loss of influence and authority within one's own faction, working-group members are usually inclined to regress, cleanse themselves of the contaminating influences, reject the learning that came from engaging with other groups, and default to their individual cultural narrative once again.

Thinking politically, then, one would view any cross-boundary working group as a kind of legislature in which one is dealing, not simply with individuals, but with people who, regardless of their personal preferences, serve in representative roles and depend on the good will of their constituents for formal and informal authority (job, credibility, affiliation). Constituents' capacity to absorb changes that involve a mix of potential benefits and losses does far more to determine the representative's latitude for variability and innovation than the personal preferences of the representative.

Therefore, in managing multiparty conflict, leading negotiators need to create a political map that identifies the perceptions of benefit and loss in each constituent group. A factional analysis is critical to strategic planning, because implementation ultimately requires adjustments of the hearts and minds in the periphery, and without such an analysis, those leading a process often become blindsided when presenting their innovative plan as they encounter constituencies who have not been through the same kind of process the representatives themselves went through to formulate the plan and its priorities. Benefits and losses need to be assessed, not simply in the usual tangible terms of property negotiation but also in terms of the loyalties that need to be renegotiated both in current professional relationships and in the hearts of constituents in relationship to their friends, families, and ancestors. Moreover, real losses include the additional challenges to identity associated with changes in responsibility and competence.

Let's examine these more closely to comprehend the power of these ties and their potential to generate adaptive failure. In the case of Israeli settlers and Palestinian refugees, the task of refashioning loyalties within each faction, which continues to block factions from reaching any peace agreement, has been central and profound. Many Jewish settlers grew up being told by their grandparents, "You are the miracle generation. For the first time in one hundred generations, you can return to live on the same sacred ground as our ancestors. You can fulfill the dream to return our

people to the land God gave us three thousand years ago." At the very same time, many people living in refugee camps were told by their grandfathers on their deathbeds, "Here is the key to our home. Guard this key, and return our family to our land." Growing up in squalor, they were sustained by stories of their homes amid groves of olive trees.

A peace settlement will quite likely require each faction to give up part of these dreams. The settlers and refugees will have to say in their hearts and among themselves, "We have failed, at least in part, to fulfill the legacy of our ancestors." Israeli settlers will have to move off of those stones. Palestinian refugees will have to mourn and memorialize their keys. Experiencing disloyalty and being accused of failure and betrayal generate extraordinary dissonance, because they risk the rupture of primary relationships that anchor identity. The internal personal negotiation, and the intrafactional negotiation, bring with them the pain of feeling that one has betrayed the people whose love and dreams one carries, individually and collectively.

Loyalties are internalized "object relations," and therefore the refashioning of loyalties changes one's individual and relational identity. A successful effort to refashion loyalties enables one to become sufficiently secure and at peace in one's relational identity that one can say in one's heart, "Ancestor, I can fulfill much of your dream, but I wrestle with realities that you did not foresee. I have to give up some of your dream to help our family thrive in the complexities of today's world."

Few tasks in life, perhaps, are more difficult and more violently resisted than facing the emotional pain of ruptured ties and accusations of betrayal. Refashioning loyalties is at the heart of the adaptive work that must happen at the personal and in-group level if new solutions are to emerge at the intergroup level.

Conclusion

Human communities have always had to acquire new adaptive capacity. With each new wrinkle of complexity, often generated by new technologies, people have had to invent and discover new ways to transact life and business across group boundaries. New ways to create bonds of affiliation and trust that could withstand the divisive emotions generated by difficult negotiations must have evolved over millennia. So it should not surprise

us that in the face of our extraordinarily changing and globalizing technologies, practices, and aspirations, we continue to face challenges that outstrip our current repertoire.

In drawing on the metaphor of biological adaptation, I have suggested that progress has three basic elements: identifying which cultural DNA to conserve, which to lose, and which innovative DNA would enable the organization or society to thrive in new and challenging environments. I describe this as a largely conservative process in light of the small proportion of the total volume of DNA that changes even with radical leaps in capacity, such as from ape to human.

Applied to cultures, politics, and individual lives, however, we can see that even what appears from a distance to be a minor loss may constitute a significant disloyalty and potential rupture of key relationships that anchor our relational identities. In retrospect, we might see the continuity with heritage and past, but in the present, the pains of change have an immediacy that makes it easy for people to lose perspective of the value of compromise and innovation. Intergroup leadership, then, begins with respect for these direct and indirect losses so that partners across boundaries can engage in phase II of their work, developing and refining in operation a strategy with appropriately conserving rhetoric so that people can imagine bringing the best of their history into the future.

The adaptive work itself is done in both in-group and intergroup spaces. In a sense, the challenge for any party often arises externally through pressure from other groups. If work is to move forward, some set of allies across boundaries from each group must step forward and generate in-group tensions, importing the challenge and now rendering it internal. Thus, human rights activists have often looked for allies *within* opposing factions to generate internal dissonance and thus dynamism toward change.[11] Of course, the loyalties within any group are usually stronger than those between groups, and therefore the likelihood that loyalties will be renegotiated increases when people are placed in tensions of loyalty with those they trust within their own group. It may, for example, be easier for a doctor who is sympathetic to alternative therapies to persuade more-conservative doctors to try an alternative therapy than it would be for the alternative practitioner to do so. In a sense, then, the politics of intergroup leadership is the intimate art of collaborating across boundaries with allies who can lead in-group change.

Notes

1. See Ronald A. Heifetz, *Leadership Without Easy Answers* (Cambridge: Belknap/ Harvard University Press, 1994), chapter 3.

2. See Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

3. See, for example, the case of Easter Island, in Heifetz, *Leadership Without Easy Answers*; Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, chapter 2; or Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2005).

4. See, for example, the works of Chris Argyris; also Ronald A. Heifetz and Marty Linsky, *Leadership on the Line: Staying Alive Through the Dangers of Leading* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002).

5. The Bible, Numbers 13–14; Aaron Wildavsky, *The Nursing Father: Moses as a Political Leader* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984).

6. M. Sternin, J. Sternin, and D. Marsh, "Scaling Up a Poverty Alleviation and Nutrition Program in Vietnam," in *Scaling Up, Scaling Down: Capacities for Overcoming Malnutrition in Developing Countries*, ed. T. Marchione (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1999).

7. For analyses of both the adaptive and the self-defeating aspects of defensive behavior at the individual level, see Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, rev. ed. (New York: International Universities Press, 1966); and George E. Vaillant, *The Wisdom of the Ego* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), chapter 1. At the group and organizational levels, see Wilfred R. Bion, *Experiences in Groups* (New York: Basic, 1961); Chris Argyris, *Strategy, Change, and Defensive Routines* (Boston: Pitman, 1985); Larry Hirschhorn, *The Workplace Within: Psychodynamics of Organizational Life* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); Chris Argyris, *Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1990); and Heifetz and Linsky, *Leadership on the Line*.

8. J. O. Hertzler, "Crises and Dictatorships," *American Sociological Review* 5 (1940): 157–169.

9. At most, the framers gave Congress the power to outlaw the importation of slaves after 1808. They had initially chosen the year 1800, but that date was set back. In any case, the constitutional clause meant little. By the time of the federal convention, Virginia and Maryland had already stopped importation of slaves, because the birth of U.S.-born slaves proved sufficient for their economic aims. See James Madison, *Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*, vol. 2 (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1987), sessions of August 21, 22, and 25, 1787, pp. 442–447, 467–469.

10. William Ury, personal communication, September 1993.

11. See Ellen Chesler, *Woman of Valor: Margaret Sanger and the Birth Control Movement in America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); and Ronald A. Heifetz, *Leadership Without Easy Answers*, chapter 8.

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